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Abstract
The decision rules underpinning human cooperative behaviour are often investigated under laboratory conditions
using monetary incentives. A major concern with this approach is that stake size may bias subjects’ decisions. This
concern is particularly acute in online studies, where stakes are often far lower than those used in laboratory or field
settings. We address this concern by conducting a Dictator Game using Amazon Mechanical Turk. In this two-player
game, one player (the dictator) determines the division of an endowment between himself and the other player. We
recruited subjects from India and the USA to play an online Dictator Game. Dictators received endowments of $1, $5
or $10. We collected two batches of data over two consecutive years. We found that players from India were less
generous when playing with a $10 stake. By contrast, the effect of stake size among players from the USA was very
small. This study indicates that the effects of stake size on decision making in economic games may vary across
populations.
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Introduction
Researchers interested in the evolution of cooperative
behaviour in humans often conduct economic games under
controlled laboratory settings, predominantly using Western
undergraduates as the subjects in these experiments. Despite
providing huge insights into the factors underpinning social
behaviour in humans, this approach has been criticised on the
grounds that Western undergraduate samples are unlikely to
be representative of humans as a whole [1] since human
behaviour is expected to vary across populations [2,3]. Partly in
response to this critique, some researchers have now turned to
using online methods to investigate variation in human social
behaviour. In particular, online labour markets, such as
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT), allow researchers to recruit
large numbers of subjects from a diverse range of backgrounds
and from different countries at relatively small costs [4,5].
However, a key issue with the proliferation of studies using
online labour markets is whether the small stakes that are
typically used in online economic games systematically affect
the decisions made by players in these games. We investigate
this issue here.
One of the simplest games for investigating variation in
prosocial behaviour is the Dictator Game [6,7]. In this two-
player game, one individual (the dictator) is endowed with a
sum of money and is told he may give some, all or none of this
endowment to a second player (the receiver). The receiver
must accept any offer made by the dictator. The income-
maximising strategy for dictators is to keep the entire
endowment and offer nothing to the receiver. However, this
strategy is not observed empirically. Instead, meta-analysis
based on laboratory studies using predominantly Western
undergraduate samples has shown that on average dictators
tend to transfer around 28% of the endowment to receivers [8].
Previous laboratory studies have shown that dictator donations
are unaffected by endowment (or stake) size. For example,
Forsythe et al. [9] found no effect of increasing stake size from
$5 to $10 on dictator transfers, while Carpenter et al. [10]
compared dictator transfers under $10 and $100 stakes and
also found no difference in relative allocation to receivers.
However, the effect of stake size in the online labour market
AMT has been less well explored. In a recent study, Amir et al.
[11] found that AMT dictators were significantly less generous
when playing for real money (a $1 stake) than when no stakes
were involved. This study did not assess whether varying the
stake size in the online environment also affected dictator
donations. This is important because most studies using AMT
tend to use stakes that are much smaller than those used in
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the physical laboratory: standard stakes in AMT are $1 or less
[11], while standard stakes in laboratory Dictator Games are
usually $10 [8]. Moreover, evidence suggests that people’s
responses to zero rewards are qualitatively different to
responses to small, positive rewards [12,13], indicating that
non-linearity in responses between zero-stakes and small-
stakes conditions might also exist in economic games. In this
study we use AMT to run a Dictator Game with stake sizes of
$1, $5 and $10 respectively. We test whether stake size affects
dictator donations after controlling for several demographic
variables.
Material & Methods
This research was approved by the University College
London ethics board project number 3720/001. Subjects were
informed that they would be taking part in an online experiment
where they could earn money. All subjects remained
anonymous so informed consent about the use of personal
data was deemed unnecessary and was therefore waived by
the University College London ethics board. Two batches of
data were collected for this study were collected using the
online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk
(www.mturk.com) in two batches, in March 2012 and March
2013. In 2012, 230 AMT workers were recruited and in 2013,
944 AMT workers were recruited. We restricted the game to
workers from India (n=584) and the USA (n=590) since the
majority of workers on AMT are from these countries [14]. Of
the 1174 workers recruited, we assigned 587 workers to the
role dictator (though the more neutral term 'decider' was used
in the instructions) while the remaining 587 workers were
assigned the role 'receiver'. We did not analyse any of the data
submitted by receivers since they have no active role to play in
the division of the endowment between dictator and receiver.
Both workers were given written instructions about the game in
English (see electronic supplementary material S1) and were
required to answer two comprehension questions correctly to
be eligible for the game. AMT workers are identified by a
unique 14-digit code rather than their names. Workers were
told that their ID would not be revealed to their partner in the
game, thus ensuring anonymity. All participants answered a set
of questions that provided demographic information (see
electronic supplementary information S1 for further details). Of
particular interest were age, gender and whether the participant
had any children. The mean ages of our Indian and U.S.A.
participants, as well as sample sizes associated with the
different variables used in our analyses are given in Table 1.
Stake size was balanced across years such that a similar
proportion of participants each year received $1, $5, and $10
stakes respectively.
Data were analysed using R version 3.0.1 [15]. We assessed
whether stake size had a significant effect on dictator
donations, while controlling for the demographic variables
above. Dictator donation was calculated by dividing the amount
transferred to the receiver by the stake ($1, $5, or $10). This
value was arcsine-square root transformed and set as the
response term in a linear model (LM, R function lm) with
normal error distribution. We analysed the Indian dataset
separately from the US dataset since, in this study, we did not
have data from a sufficient number of countries to look at
cross-cultural variation in dictator behaviour in any meaningful
way.
We created two general linear models (one for India, n =
282; one for the USA, n = 292) with the transformed value of
dictator donation set as the response term. We used an
information theoretic approach with model averaging as
described in [16]. Under an information-theoretic approach, a
series of candidate models are generated, with each model
representing a biological hypothesis. Rather than testing a null
hypothesis, the relative degree of support for each model from
the candidate set is calculated [17]. By comparing different
models, it is possible to determine the relative importance of
different explanatory terms. For both India and the USA, a
Table 1. Information on mean values ± SE (where
appropriate) and sample sizes for the explanatory terms
used in the statistical models.
Parameter India (n = 282) USA (n = 292)
Age Mean = 28.9 ± 0.5 Mean = 28.4 ± 0.5
 Range = 18 - 65 Range = 17 - 65
Gender (n) Females = 94 Females = 101
 Males = 188 Males = 191
Children (n) No = 183 No = 234
 Yes = 99 Yes = 58
Stake size (n) $1 = 95 $1 = 97
 $5 = 93 $5 = 99
 $10 = 94 $10 = 96
Year (n) 2012 = 57 2012 = 58
 2013 = 225 2013 = 234
Table 2. The top models (models within 2AICc units of the
best model), with AICc values and Akaike weights (wi).
Country Model Rank Parameters df AICc wi
India 1
Children +
Stake +
Year
6 82.0 0.40
 2 Stake +Year 5 83.2 0.22
 3
Age +
Stake +
Year
6 83.4 0.20
 4
Children +
Gender+
Stake +
Year
7 83.7 0.17
USA 1 Gender 3 194.2 0.51
 2 Gender +Stake 5 195.2 0.30
 3 Age +Gender 4 196.2 0.19
The best model for each country is highlighted.
Stake-Size Effects in an Online Dictator Game
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global model was first specified which included the following
terms: dictator age, gender, stake size ($1, $5, or $10),
whether the dictator had any children or not and the year that
the data were collected (2012/2013). We also included possible
two-way interactions between stake size and the other
explanatory variables. Following the specification of the global
model, the input variables were standardized according to [18].
Standardizing input variables allows the relative strength of
parameter estimates to be interpreted. We used the package
MuMIn [19] to derive and compare submodels from this initial
global model (see 16 for all details). Models were compared to
one another using Akaike’s Information Criterion corrected for
small sample sizes (AICc) [20]. A subset of 'top models' were
defined by taking the best model (the model with the lowest
AICc value) and any models within 2AICc units of the best
model (following [16,17]). Using this subset of models, we
computed the average parameter estimates for each term
included in the subset of models, as well as the relative
importance of the term. Importance is calculated by summing
the Akaike weights of all models where the term in question is
included in the model. Akaike weights represent the probability
of a given model being the true model (compared to other
candidate models in the set) [17]. Importance can therefore be
thought of as the probability that the term in question is a
component of the best model [21]. In the results section, we
only present the parameter estimates from the top models
(those that were within 2 AICc units of the best model).
Results
INDIA
For subjects from India, we found three models which were
within 2AICc units of the best model (Table 2). Year and stake
size were components of all the top models (Table 2). Our
Indian players seemed to be less generous in the second year
of the study (Figure 1) and also less generous when playing
with the $10, as opposed to the $1 or $5, stake (Figure 2).
However, there was no difference in donations between the $1
and $5 stakes. Players with children seemed to be more
generous than players without children (importance = 0.57),
although the confidence intervals for this term span zero
meaning that this effect was quite weak. Other component
variables included in the four top models were age (importance
= 0.20) and gender (importance = 0.17). Again, for both these
terms, the confidence intervals spanned zero meaning that
they were unlikely to affect dictator donations (Table 3).
USA
For subjects from the USA, we found two models which were
within 2 AICc units of the best model (Table 2). Female
dictators were more generous than male dictators (importance
= 1, Figure 3, Table 4). Stake size was included as a
component in the second best model with an importance of 0.3,
although, unlike the data from Indian players, there was no
clear directional effect of larger stake sizes on dictator
donations, and the confidence intervals for all levels of this
variable spanned zero (Table 4). Age was also included as a
component of the third best model (importance = 0.19) but, as
with stake size, the confidence intervals include zero for this
term. None of our top models included the year in which data
were collected or whether the dictator had children.
Figure 1.  Boxplot of dictator donations (proportion of
endowment given to receiver) according to year generated
from raw data from Indian players.  Solid lines represent
medians while the upper and lower boundaries of the box are
the upper and lower quartiles of the data. The highest and
lowest values in the data (excluding outliers) are indicated by
the bars extending from the boxes. Circles represent outliers.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073131.g001
Table 3. Estimates, unconditional standard errors,
confidence intervals and relative importance for parameters
included in the top models for players from India.
Parameter Estimate
Unconditional
SE
Confidence
Interval
Relative
Importance
Intercept 0.49 0.03 (0.43, 0.55)  
Stake    1.00
$1 0.00 0.00 (0.00, 0.00)  
$5 -0.01 0.04 (-0.09, 0.07)  
$10 -0.12 0.04 (-0.20, -0.04)  
Year
(2012/2013) -0.14 0.04 (-0.22, -0.06) 1.00
Children (N/Y) 0.06 0.04 (-0.01, 0.13) 0.57
Age 0.05 0.03 (-0.02, 0.11) 0.20
Gender (F /
M) 0.02 0.04 (-0.05, 0.10) 0.17
Effect sizes have been standardized on two SD following [18] and standard errors
are unconditional, meaning that they incorporate model selection uncertainty [17]
(see methods for details).
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Discussion
This study shows that stake size may affect cooperative
behaviour in a Dictator Game. Specifically, the Indian
participants were significantly less generous when playing with
a $10 stake than with either the $1 or the $5 stake. In contrast,
stake size did not seem to affect the behaviour of US
participants. We also found that Indian participants were less
generous in the second year of the study. Again, this result was
not replicated for US participants. Below we discuss some of
the possible interpretations of these findings.
It is unclear why the Indian players seemed to be affected by
the highest stake size in this study. It is likely that stakes of all
sizes were more valuable in India - Indian workers report lower
median annual income than US workers in AMT (N. Raihani,
unpublished data). It may be the case that the $10 stake was
very salient for the Indian subgroup; whereas for US
participants this stake size was still relatively meaningless. If
this were the case, and if subjects generally become less
generous as the perceived value of the stake increases, then
we might also expect to replicate the negative effect of stake
size on generosity in the US subgroup if the 'high stake'
treatment were increased to $50 or $100 (although Carpenter
et al. 2005 [10] found no effect of increasing stake from $10 to
$100 on dictator behaviour using US students). The effect of
substantially increasing the stake for US players could be
explored in future studies. Another possibility for the apparent
sensitivity of Indian players to stake size is that these players
Figure 2.  Boxplot of dictator donations (proportion of
endowment given to receiver) according to stake size for
Indian players.  Solid lines represent medians while the upper
and lower boundaries of the box are the upper and lower
quartiles of the data. The highest and lowest values in the data
(excluding outliers) are indicated by the bars extending from
the boxes. Circles represent outliers.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073131.g002
might have used AMT chat forums or discussion boards to talk
about the game structure and to advise fellow workers that
tasks with different stake amounts were available. Although
workers are supposed to accept tasks in numerical order,
workers are also able to preview tasks in a batch before
choosing which one to accept. Arguably, players that 'cheat' in
this way may also have been more likely to keep an unfair
share of the endowment. We have no way to test whether
Figure 3.  Boxplot of dictator donations (proportion of
endowment given to receiver) according to gender for US
players.  Solid lines represent medians while the upper and
lower boundaries of the box are the upper and lower quartiles
of the data. The highest and lowest values in the data
(excluding outliers) are indicated by the bars extending from
the boxes.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073131.g003
Table 4. Estimates, unconditional standard errors,
confidence intervals and relative importance for parameters
included in the top models for players from USA.
Parameter Estimate
Unconditional
SE
Confidence
Interval
Relative
Importance
Intercept 0.56 0.03 (0.50, 0.61)  
Gender (F /
M) -0.09 0.04 (-0.17, -0.01) 1.00
Stake    0.30
$1 0.00 0.00 (0.00, 0.00)  
$5 -0.08 0.05 (-0.17, 0.02)  
$10 -0.01 0.05 (-0.10, 0.08)  
Age -0.01 0.04 (-0.09, 0.07) 0.19
Effect sizes have been standardized on two SD following [18] and standard errors
are unconditional, meaning that they incorporate model selection uncertainty [17]
(see methods for details).
Stake-Size Effects in an Online Dictator Game
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players were preferentially selecting the highest paying tasks
based on information received from discussion boards. We
conducted an informal survey which hints that US players are
more likely to use discussion boards than Indian players (45/50
US respondents use discussion boards compared with 15/50
Indian respondents, N. Raihani, unpublished data). Moreover,
the main discussion board used by AMT workers, MTurk
Forum (www.mturkforum.com), does not allow contributors to
post information about the content of tasks. Nevertheless, the
possibility that players might discuss task content on
discussion boards is something for us - and other researchers
using AMT - to be aware of for future studies.
We found that the behaviour of the Indian players in this
online game varied across years - players were less generous
in the second year of the study than in the first year. It is
currently not clear why this was the case. The possibility that
workers discussed the game in online forums could explain the
differences in behaviour between year one and two of the study
- again, we do not know whether this is the case but it is
possible. Although we are not able to offer a good explanation
for the variation in behaviour across year one and two of the
study in the Indian players, the fact that we found a temporal
difference in generosity indicates that researchers should be
cautious when using the 'snapshot' approach to data collection.
It may often be the case that patterns of behaviour change
temporally but since most studies fail to be replicated over
time, such variation may often be obscured.
In this study, male participants from the USA were less
generous than females. This finding is consistent with previous
Dictator Game studies [23,24] and with a recent meta-analysis
of Dictator Games which showed that women on average give
significantly more of the initial endowment away than men [8].
The finding that women are more cooperative than men has
also been shown in other economic games (e.g. [25,26]) but
the effect is not universal [27-29] even in Dictator Games [30].
It has been argued that women may behave more
cooperatively than men in such economic games because
women are generally more socially-oriented while men are
more individually-oriented [23,31], although the ultimate
reasons for these proposed differences in male and female
preferences are currently unclear. We did not replicate the
gender effect among our Indian subgroup, however. Currently,
we are not sure why we would find a gender effect on dictator
donations among US players but not among Indian players. It
is possible that players’ interpretation of the game, or their
perceptions of what constitutes a fair donation, may have
varied cross-culturally. Indeed, cross-cultural differences have
been highlighted in other pro-social and anti-social tendencies
previously [3]. To test this hypothesis, we would need to collect
data from more countries. However, as described above, our
mixed findings with regards to gender differences in economic
games are not atypical.
To summarise, online labour markets offer researchers
interested in human behaviour a relatively cheap and fast way
to generate large bodies of data. Even more importantly,
recruiting participants from online labour markets allows
researchers to circumvent several of the criticisms that have
been levelled against studies using Western undergraduates
as the subject base. While there is still a debate to be had
about the extent to which AMT workers are truly representative
of their particular country or culture, it is clear that there is
significant demographic variation among AMT workers that is
not present among participants of most laboratory studies.
Several studies have been performed which validate the results
obtained using AMT against those obtained in laboratory
environments. Here, we have shown that varying stake size
from $1 to $10 did not have a significant effect on decisions
made by US players but that increasing stake sizes seemed to
result in decreased generosity among the Indian players.
Previous studies have shown that behaviour in economic
games can vary across populations [2,3] but our findings raise
the possibility that effects of stake size may also show inter-
population variation. This is something to be aware of for future
studies.
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